Jane Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C. (E.D. Mich. Oct. 13, 2015). During a flight from Abu Dhabi to Chicago, the passenger/plaintiff was pricked by a discarded syringe when she reached into in a seatback pocket. The plaintiff sought treatment from her physician, who prescribed antiviral drugs and HIV and hepatitis tests. The tests, which were administered over the course of a year, showed that the plaintiff had not developed HIV.
The plaintiff sued Etihad under the Montreal Convention. She alleged that that her injury had caused her emotional distress and mental anguish, primarily in the form of her fear of developing HIV or hepatitis. Her husband alleged a derivative loss of consortium claim.
Etihad moved for partial summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff’s fear of contagion damages were not recoverable under the Montreal Convention because they did not arise from a “bodily injury” within the meaning of Article 17(1) of the Convention. That provision states as follows: “The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.” Etihad cited numerous cases arising under the Montreal Convention, and under its Warsaw Convention predecessor, rejecting passengers’ recovery of emotional distress damages that were not caused by any “bodily injury.”
Etihad argued that the plaintiff’s fear of contagion damages were not caused by the “very minor and brief pain” resulting from the needlestick, i.e., the only “bodily injury” that occurred, but by her “unfounded fear of exposure to a contagious disease.” Etihad also argued that the plaintiff’s fear of contagion damages were too speculative to be recovered under Michigan law.
The court agreed with Etihad’s Montreal Convention argument and granted the airline’s motion. The court did not consider Etihad’s Michigan law argument.
Update: On August 30, 2017, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the plain text of the Montreal Convention allowed the plaintiff to recover all her “damage sustained” from the needlestick, which included damages for both her physical and accompanying mental injuries.