Airlines Reporting Corporation v. Sudbury Travel, Ltd. (E.D.V.A. Sept. 28, 2011). In 2009, ARC initiated an arbitration before the Travel Agent Arbiter seeking amounts owed by accredited agent Sudbury Travel, Ltd. Less than three weeks later, ARC withdrew its arbitration complaint. In his dismissal notice, the Arbiter noted that the applicable rule allowed such withdrawal provided that its purpose “is not to litigate the identical claims in a state or federal court or before any other governmental body.”
Over a year later, ARC filed a Virginia state court complaint against Sudbury based on the same events but naming three additional defendants, “officer/director” Lee Goodstone and two other individuals. The complaint, which sought damages in excess of $240,000, alleged three counts: breach of contract against Sudbury only and conversion and breach of fiduciary duty against all four defendants. ARC alleged three forms of conversion – conversion of ticket sales proceeds, conversion of funds in the agent’s bank account securing a letter of credit in ARC’s favor and conversion of ticket stock. Goodstone removed the case to federal court and filed a counterclaim against ARC.
Six months and over 70 docket entries (including two amended complaints and numerous motions) later, ARC filed a motion to compel arbitration before the Arbiter. ARC explained that it had withdrawn its previous arbitration complaint because “it appeared the process was getting no traction” with Sudbury. Sudbury and Goodstone opposed the motion, which the court denied.
In July 2011, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. In its order on the motions, the court first, citing the Arbiter’s 2009 dismissal notice regarding relitigation of identical claims in court, transferred ARC’s claims against Sudbury back to the Arbiter.
Next, the court rejected ARC’s conversion claims against Goodstone for the same reasons the same court rejected them ten years ago in Airlines Reporting Corporation v. Pishvaian, 155 F. Supp.2d 659 (E.D.V.A. 2001). The court rejected ARC’s sales proceeds conversion claim because the Agent Reporting Agreement, while labeling such proceeds as “trust” funds, did not actually establish a trust relationship because it did not require that sales proceeds be segregated, i.e., it allowed such proceeds to be commingled with general agency assets. The court rejected ARC’s conversion claim regarding the funds securing the letter of credit for the same reason. The court rejected the travel documents conversion claim because the facts showed that Goodstone’s conduct, like that of the agency owner in Pishvaian, was only “supervisory and was not directed at the converted ticket stock.”
The court then rejected ARC’s breach of fiduciary duty cause of action as barred by Virginia’s two-year limitation period. ARC alleged that the misdeeds occurred during a period ending in July 2008, but it filed its complaint in September 2010.
Finally, the court rejected Goodstone’s Fair Debt Collections Practices Act and Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A counterclaims because ARC was seeking to collect a business debt, not a consumer debt.
So, at the end of the day, ARC and Sudbury returned to the Arbiter and Goodstone was out of the case. ARC filed a motion for a default judgment against the other two defendants, but the court has not ruled on it.
Note: Now pending in the Eastern District of Virginia are four cases – ARC v. Sarrion Travel, Inc. ($152,000+ damages), ARC v. Mundo Travel Corp. ($80,000+ damages), ARC v. Academic Travel Services International ($87,000+ damages) and ARC v. Cartegena Travel and Tours, Inc. ($85,000+ damages) – in which ARC is alleging the same conversion claims against agency principals that were rejected in Sudbury and Pishvaian. There must be a better way for ARC to pursue claims against agency principals than to be forced to rely on trust-based causes of action that have repeatedly come up short. In September, ARC announced that it is embarking on an effort to modernize its agent accreditation procedures. That effort should include modernization of the Agent Reporting Agreement as well.
First, to receive accreditation, an agency’s principals should be required to consent, in their personal capacities, to arbitration or litigation of ARC’s claims against them related to the ARA. Agency owners might complain about the costs of defending against ARC’s claims, but a provision requiring that the losing party in the proceeding pay the winning party’s attorneys’ fees and expenses would resolve any costs objection.
Second, the ARA should require that agents segregate sales proceeds in a separate account and prohibit them from commingling such proceeds with other funds. The ARA designates sales proceeds as trust funds – it provides that “[t]he Agent recognizes that the proceeds of the sales, less the Agent’s commissions, if any, on these ARC Traffic Documents are the property of the Carrier and shall be held in trust until accounted for to the Carrier” – so it stands to reason that agents should be required to treat such funds accordingly. Without a segregation requirement, the ARA’s “trust” language will continue to fail ARC in its pursuit of tort claims arising under Virginia law, which governs the interpretation of the ARA.